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TH EORY of the proper relation between industry and government, and not the historical or grammatical meaning of words in
the constitution, supplies the only clew to the most important
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
As an examination of the cases in which the court has changed its mind
seems to indicate, the view that industry and trade ought to be free from
government control has been a consistent influence on the court's decisions. Mr. justice Story and Chief Justice Marshall tried unsuccessfully
to derive some general theory of protection to freedom of trade from the
words of the contract clause.' The development of a modem interpretation of the meaning of the "liberty" and "property" protected by the due
process clauses resulted later in a body of decisions such as they would
doubtless have approved.
The creation of modem due process doctrine has followed a familiar
but somewhat curious course. "Liberty" and "property" were first given
federal constitutional protection in the form of property in slaves and
liberty to deal with slave property as the owner wished.2 The appearance
* For the writer's background, and earlier brief comments on related matters, see r Univ.

Cbi. L. Rev. 320 (1933); 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 301 (1935). The experience there referred to has
been further supplemented by continued work as a special consultant, particularly in connection with the steel code administration, in the recovery administration. The present comment
is for the most part a brief summary of a position based on earlier study, and more fully discussed in an earlier paper. See the writer's Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication, 46
Harv. L. Rev. 361, 593, 795 (1933). Support for and explanation of these brief observations
must be left partly to that paper.
Thoughtful and more or less critical comments on Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (i935), have appeared. See Clark, The Supreme Court and the N.R.A.,
83 New Republic 120 (June 12, 1935); McBain, The Constitution and the New Deal, 25 Yale
Review 114 (1935); Powell, Would the Supreme Court Block a Planned Economy?, 12 Fortune,
no. 2, 48 (August, 1935). See also Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court (1934). The
psychological effects of the publication of a book with this title may be worth some speculation.
Corbin, What's a United State?, 98 Scribner's Magazine 257 (November 1935) has appeared since this comment went to press.
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of constitutional liberty and property in this form was, of course, one of
the occasions for the Civil War. It is, indeed, one of the ironies of current
history that Lincoln, who was responsible for the destruction of the property rights which the Dred Scott decision tried to protect, 3 and who was
responsible both for fundamental changes in the constitution and for saving it, should be appealed to as the supposed opponent of all constitutional change.
The appearance of constitutional liberty and property in the Dred
Scott case was somewhat tentative. An effort to invoke due process doctrine against the inflationary legal tender legislation was rather summarily
disposed of. 4 The idea persisted, however, and was expressed forcefully
in the dissenting opinions in the Slaughter House cases. 5 Finally in 1897
the idea was used to give to a national insurance business the kind of
protection against state laws that had been developed for many other
businesses by the construction of the commerce clause; and in a limited
decision, useful commercially, the modem view of the meaning of liberty
and property in the due process clauses was finally adopted by the Supreme Court.6
The social consequences of the development of this modern doctrine
have since become apparent. One need only recall the decision that states
may not impose a penalty upon the formation of yellow dog contracts;7
and that Congress may not authorize a commission to require the payment of living wages to women in the District of Columbia.'
The decisions establishing the modern view of the meaning of liberty
and property in the due process clauses, write into the law an economic
doctrine which has the support of one group of students of economic
theory, but which has no adequate support in the legislative or judicial
history of the due process clauses.
General considerations similarly seem necessary, to explain the development of a useful and less notable line of decisions. The commerce clause
provides that "the Congress shall have Power .... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes; .... ." It was early, and necessarily, decided that in consequence
3 See 2 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 329-332 (2d ed. 1926) for
interesting observations on Lincoln's attitude toward the Dred Scott decision.
4 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 457, 551 (1870).
s 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36 (1873).
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7Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). Cf. Texas and New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood
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of this clause state legislation inconsistent with authorized congressional
legislation must be treated as ineffectual by the courts. 9 In arguing the
case which established this proposition, however, Daniel Webster went
further, and urged that a limit on state legislation was to be found in the
words of the clause themselves. His argument was that the power of
states over interstate commerce met at some point a limit in the grant of
power to Congress over interstate commerce.
Whether considered in the light of history, grammar, or logic, the argument will not bear a moment's examination. It did, however, appeal to
the practical sense of persons who were familiar with interstate commercial jealousies; and it won a cautious and qualified suggestion of approval
in a dictum by Chief Justice Marshall.
Webster pressed the argument again in cases which divided the court
under Chief Justice Taney.10 The cases were decided without any final
determination about the proposed doctrine; and it was not applied to
invalidate legislation until 1873." Since then the basic theory of Webster's arguments has been developed into a large body of technical rules,
protecting interstate commerce against many kinds of interference by
regulatory and tax measures of the states.
Again general ideas with respect to freedom of trade appear to have
had their influence on decisions defining the power of Congress over interstate commerce. The Sherman Act was at first threatened with frustration by a decision that a monopoly of the sugar refining capacity of the
country was not engaged in interstate commerce;" and it has been held
that while Congress could forbid the transportation of contraceptives,
women, lottery tickets, impure food, and stolen automobiles in interstate
4
commerce,' 3 it could not assure railroad workers the right to organize1
nor prevent the transportation of the products of child labor in interstate
commerce. s
9 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1 (1824). Cf. Brown v. Maryland,

12
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419 (1827).
10 The License Cases, 5 How. (U.S.) 504 (1847); The Passenger Cases, 7 How. (U.S.) 283
(I849). Cf. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. (U.S.) 299 (1852);
Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. (U.S.) 3z (1867).
"1Case of the State Freight Tax, i Wall. (U.S.) 232 (873).

- United States v. E. C. Knight Co., r56 U.S. 1 (1895).
"3Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (i9o3); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1gV);
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 321 (1913); Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
'4 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (igog). Cf.Texas and New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks, supranote 7. But cf. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
SHammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (x918).
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Similar influences seem necessary to explain the development and recent
adoption by the Supreme Court of the American doctrine limiting delegation of legislative power to executive and administrative officers.
Insofar as the doctrine is supposed to be derived from the principle of
the separation of powers, it should be remembered that that principle
was originally conceived of as a means of limiting the power of any government by dividing its functions among various organs.16 For the success of the principle no clear-cut, consistent, analytical distinction between
the three or four or five sorts of power which governments exercise is
necessary; nor is any such distinction possible. A simple recognition of
the obvious directions of the constitution with respect to such matters
as elections, tenure of office, the assembly of Congress, impeachment, veto,
pardon, and more important functions specifically assigned, would go far
to assure the organization which those who developed the theory of the
separation of powers had in mind.
Insofar as the new doctrine with respect to the delegation of powers
has an independent origin, there is little or no historical justification for
it. The Latin maxim which has been used to give it sanctity has been
shown to be derived from a misprint in an early edition of Bracton; and
it is a maxim whose serious application to commercial matters would
interfere seriously with industry and trade. As the maxim should have
appeared in Bracton it meant only that the king could not delegate
official authority on such terms as to deprive himself of ultimate authority. 7 In discussing the English government in 16go, Locke made some
observations about the delegation of power which suggest the modem
doctrine; but which do not seem necessarily to imply any principle but
one which would prevent Parliament from giving up its power to the
crown irrevocably. 8 Again it would seem that an observation of the obvious directions of the constitution with respect to elections, the assembly
of Congress, and legislation would be enough to protect the country
against the kind of dictatorship which would result from a congressional
decision to confer large powers irrevocably or for an extended period on
the president.
American lawyers have, however, developed the principles of the separation of powers and the non-delegability of legislative power into a rex6 See the writer's The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 385 (1935).
X7Duff and Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Con-

stitutional Law, 14 Corn. L.Q. 168 (1929).
zs Locke, Of Civil Government Bk. II, c. XI, § 141; c. XIV, § i59. (Everyman's ed. i924)
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fined doctrine; and this doctrine was this year for the first time applied
by the Supreme Court. 9
II

The development of our major constitutional doctrines has taken place
by a subtle, cautious, and tentative type of reasoning; which has not infrequently involved the court in changes of mind.
It is possible that a number of previous decisions were overruled when
it was decided last June that Congress could not authorize the president
to permit industrial groups to combine to improve their economic position,
subject to safeguards in the public interest, and protected against minority
interference by legal sanctions; and that, even if Congress defined more
specifically the functions of the president, it could not authorize the application of such a scheme of legislation to commercial transactions not in
a stream of interstate commerce nor affecting by competition a stream of
interstate commerce.

20

The large objectives of promoting the development of a solvent and
efficient railroad system have been entrusted by Congress to the Interstate Commerce Commission; and these large objectives may be promoted, among other means, by authority from the Commission for the
lease of property by one railroad to another whenever it is found to be
"in the public interest," and "on such terms and conditions as shall be
''2
found by the commission to be just and reasonable in the premises. "
In deciding that it had authority to condemn a plan of consolidation by
the use of leases, on the ground that it gave control to persons who might
have little or no interest in the system as owners, the commission assumed
its widest power under these provisions2 2 Its exercise of power for this
purpose seems-though it has not been squarely passed upon-to have
3
been given some approval by the Supreme Court.2
'9 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (I934); Schechter Poultry Corporation v.

United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Cf. Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
See 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 632 (1935). Cf. Ray and Wienke, Hot Oil on Uncharted Seas of
Delegated Powers, 29 Ill.
L. Rev. 1021 (1935).
20Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, supra note i9.
- See 41 Stat. 48o-482 (1920), 49 U.S.C.A. § 5
statute which should be considered together.

Nickle Plate Unification, Io5 I.C.C. 425

(I),

(2),

(4), (8) (r929) for portions of the

(1926).

Discussing the section under consideration, the court has said: "The provisions now before us were the additions made by Transportation Act, 192o, and the term 'public interest' as
thus used is not a concept without ascertainable criteria, but has direct relation to adequacy of
transportation service, to its essential conditions of economy and efficiency, and to appropriate
provision and best use of transportation facilities, questions to which the Interstate Commerce
Commission has constantly addressed itself in the exercise of the authority conferred." New
York Central Securities Corporation v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 25 (932).
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The validity of the section itself has been squarely upheld by the
court. 24 Differences may of course be pointed out;2 5 but it is difficult to
see any controlling distinction between the delegation of power to promote the prosperity of the railroad industry to an administrative commission, and the delegation of power to promote the prosperity of other
industries to the president of the United States.
The recent decision of the court has a more important application to
the problem of interstate commerce. The court seems to disclaim making
any judgment upon the economic theory on which the Recovery Act was
framed and administered. It must, therefore, for purposes of its discussion, assume that Congress and the Administration might legitimately
have acted on the theory that the protection of wage levels and price
stability everywhere would prove an effective means of restoring the entire commerce of the country.
On these assumptions it is difficult to determine whether the court's
early decision that a monopoly of the sugar refining capacity of the
country was not engaged in interstate commerce and so not subject to
the Sherman Act, has had its authority revived.26 It has been commonly
supposed that this early decision had been silently overruled by a long
line of intervening decisions. 27 Are these decisions in turn now to be
treated as overruled? The question is made particularly acute by the
court's quotation of the observation that "building is as essentially
local as mining, manufacturing, or growing crops.' 2 This quotation
has been read by some as a warning; but it is either a meaningless truism
or a return inthe direction of the theory of the sugar case.
Again it has been held that Congress may authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate purely intra-state rates, or to permit the
abandonment of an intra-state carrier's track, when authority to exercise
such power has been seriously regarded by Congress as essential to the
effective exercise of the Commission's power over interstate transportation.29 And Congress has been held authorized to provide for the control
8

24 New York Central Securities Corporation v. United States, supra note 23. And cf. New
England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184 (1923).
25 Is it significant, for example, that one act enumerates the subjects on which an administrative agency is authorized to exercise its practical judgment?
26 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., supra note 12.
27Cf., for example, Swift & Co. v. United States, i96 U.S. 375 (19o5).
2 Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, supra note Ig, at 547, quoted from Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 82 (1925).
29 Railroad Comm. of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922); Transit
Comm. v. United States, 284 U.S. 360 (1932).
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of transactions in grain futures, on the ground that such transactionsthan which nothing could be more local-might legitimately be regarded
as having a significant effect on transactions controlling the interstate
3°
movement of grain.
If economic development has reached a stage at which much that was
formerly regarded as of local concern has taken on national significance,
and become closely related to the health of interstate trade, it may indeed
require the development of new conceptions about the power of Congress
in dealing with interstate commerce. The development of these new conceptions seems required, under conditions, for example, like those of
1933, by the underlying theory of the constitution.
In view of the history of constitutional doctrine, the Chief Justice's
observation that "It is not the province of the court to consider the advantages or disadvantages .... of a centralized system" 3' seems a little
lacking in completeness. It is difficult to understand how measures seriously designed to rescue or protect all our commerce from paralysis, can
be condemned as not within the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce. There were serious economic and administrative objections
to the measures undertaken by the Administration in 1933, as there were
to any course of action or inaction then open to any administration. But
to turn economic objections into constitutional prohibitions seems unconstitutional.
30Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S.
31Schechter

1 (1923).

Poultry Corporation v. United States, supra note ig, at 549.

